National Diet of Japan
Native name国会
Transcription nameKokkai
Legislature221st Session of the National Diet
Foundation29 November 1890
(135)
President of the House of CouncillorsMasakazu Sekiguchi
Party 1LDP
Election 111 November 2024
Speaker of the House of RepresentativesEisuke Mori
Party 2LDP
Election 218 February 2026
Prime MinisterSanae Takaichi
Party 3LDP
Election 321 October 2025
House 1House of Councillors
Structure 1Japan House of Councillors 2024.svg
Structure1 res250px
Political groups 1

Government (101)

Supported by (19)

Opposition (121)

Unaffiliated (6)

Vacant (1)

  • Vacant (1)
House 2House of Representatives
Structure 2House of Representatives Japan February 2026.svg
Structure2 res250px
Political groups 2

Government (316)

Supported by (36)

Opposition (106)

Unaffiliated (7)

Voting system 1Parallel voting:
Single non-transferable vote (148 seats)
Party-list proportional representation (100 seats)
Staggered elections
Voting system 2Parallel voting:
First-past-the-post voting (289 seats)
Party-list proportional representation (176 seats)
Last election 120 July 2025
Next election 12028
Last election 28 February 2026
Next election 2By 2030
Session roomDiet of Japan Kokkai 2009.jpg
Meeting placeNational Diet Building,
Nagatachō 1-7-1, Chiyoda District, Tokyo, Japan
35°40′33″N 139°44′42″E
Website

The National Diet (国会, Kokkai, kok̚.kai[1]) is the national legislature of Japan. It is composed of a lower house, called the House of Representatives (衆議院, Shūgiin), and an upper house, the House of Councillors (参議院, Sangiin). Both houses are directly elected under a parallel voting system. In addition to passing laws, the Diet is formally responsible for nominating the prime minister. The Diet was first established as the Imperial Diet in 1890 under the Meiji Constitution, and took its current form in 1947 upon the adoption of the post-war constitution. Both houses meet in the National Diet Building (国会議事堂, Kokkai-gijidō) in Nagatachō, Chiyoda, Tokyo.

Composition

The houses of the National Diet are both elected under parallel voting systems. This means that the seats to be filled in any given election are divided into two groups, each elected by a different method; the main difference between the houses is in the sizes of the two groups and how they are elected. Voters are asked to cast two votes: one for an individual candidate in a constituency, and one for a party list. Any national of Japan at least 18 years of age may vote in these elections, reduced from age 20 in 2016.[2][3] Japan's parallel voting system (mixed-member majoritarian) is not to be confused with the mixed-member proportional systems used in many other nations. The Constitution of Japan does not specify the number of members of each house of the Diet, the voting system, or the necessary qualifications of those who may vote or be returned in parliamentary elections, thus allowing all of these things to be determined by ordinary law. However it does guarantee universal adult suffrage and a secret ballot. It also stipulates that the electoral law must not discriminate in terms of "race, creed, sex, social status, family origin, education, property or income".[4]

The election of Diet members is controlled by statutes passed by the Diet. This is a source of contention concerning re-apportionment of prefectures' seats in response to changes of population distribution. For example, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) had controlled Japan for most of its post-war history, and it gained much of its support from rural areas. During the post-war era, large numbers of people relocated to urban centers for economic reasons; though some re-apportionments have been made to the number of each prefecture's assigned seats in the Diet, rural areas generally have more representation than do urban areas.[5] Among rural interests, Japanese rice farmers historically had particular influence in internal LDP politics and national policies on trade and agricultural subsidies.[6]

The Supreme Court of Japan began exercising judicial review of apportionment laws following the Kurokawa decision of 1976, invalidating an election in which one district in Hyōgo Prefecture received five times the representation of another district in Osaka Prefecture.[7][8] In the most recent elections, the malapportionment ratio amounted to 3.03 in the House of Councillors (2022 election: Kanagawa/Fukui)[9] and 2.06 in the House of Representatives (2024 election: Hokkaidō 3/Tottori 1).[10]

Candidates for the lower house must be 25 years old or older and 30 years or older for the upper house. All candidates must be Japanese nationals. Under Article 49 of Japan's Constitution, Diet members are paid about ¥1.3 million a month in salary. Each lawmaker is entitled to employ three secretaries with taxpayer funds, and to receive free Shinkansen tickets, and four round-trip airplane tickets a month to enable them to travel back and forth to their home districts.[11]

Powers

Article 41 of the Constitution describes the National Diet as "the highest organ of State power" and "the sole law-making organ of the State". This statement is in forceful contrast to the Meiji Constitution, which described the Emperor as the one who exercised legislative power with the consent of the Diet. The Diet's responsibilities include not only the making of laws but also the approval of the annual national budget that the government submits and the ratification of treaties. It can also initiate draft constitutional amendments, which, if approved, must be presented to the people in a referendum. The Diet may conduct "investigations in relation to government" (Article 62).

The Prime Minister must be designated by Diet resolution, establishing the principle of legislative supremacy over executive government agencies (Article 67). The government can also be dissolved by the Diet if the House of Representatives passes a motion of no confidence introduced by fifty members of the House of Representatives. Government officials, including the Prime Minister and Cabinet members, are required to appear before Diet investigative committees and answer inquiries. The Diet also has the power to impeach judges convicted of criminal or irregular conduct.[4]

In most circumstances, in order to become law a bill must be first passed by both houses of the Diet and then promulgated by the Emperor. This role of the Emperor is similar to the Royal Assent in some other nations; however, the Emperor cannot refuse to promulgate a law and therefore his legislative role is merely a formality.[12]

The House of Representatives is the more powerful chamber of the Diet.[13] While the House of Representatives cannot usually overrule the House of Councillors on a bill, the House of Councillors can only delay the adoption of a budget or a treaty that has been approved by the House of Representatives, and the House of Councillors has almost no power at all to prevent the lower house from selecting any Prime Minister it wishes. Furthermore, once appointed it is the confidence of the House of Representatives alone that the Prime Minister must enjoy in order to continue in office. The House of Representatives can overrule the upper house in the following circumstances:[14]

  • If a bill is adopted by the House of Representatives and then either rejected, amended or not approved within 60 days by the House of Councillors, then the bill will become law if again adopted by the House of Representatives by a majority of at least two-thirds of members present.[15]
  • If both houses cannot agree on a budget or a treaty, even through the appointment of a joint committee of the Diet, or if the House of Councillors fails to take final action on a proposed budget or treaty within 30 days of its approval by the House of Representatives, then the decision of the lower house is deemed to be that of the Diet.[15]
  • If both houses cannot agree on a candidate for Prime Minister, even through a joint committee, or if the House of Councillors fails to designate a candidate within 10 days of House of Representatives' decision, then the nominee of the lower house is deemed to be that of the Diet.

Activities

Under the Constitution, at least one session of the Diet must be convened each year. Technically, only the House of Representatives is dissolved before an election. But, while the lower house is in dissolution, the House of Councillors is usually "closed". The Emperor both convokes the Diet and dissolves the House of Representatives but in doing so must act on the advice of the Cabinet. In an emergency the Cabinet can convoke the Diet for an extraordinary session, and an extraordinary session may be requested by one-quarter of the members of either house.[16] At the beginning of each parliamentary session, the Emperor reads a special speech from his throne in the chamber of the House of Councillors.[17]

The presence of one-third of the membership of either house constitutes a quorum[16] and deliberations are in public unless at least two-thirds of those present agree otherwise. Each house elects its own presiding officer who casts the deciding vote in the event of a tie. The Diet has parliamentary immunity. Members of each house have certain protections against arrest while the Diet is in session and arrested members must be released during the term of the session if the House demands. They are immune outside the house for words spoken and votes cast in the House.[18][19] Each house of the Diet determines its own standing orders and has responsibility for disciplining its own members. A member may be expelled, but only by a two-thirds majority vote. Every member of the Cabinet has the right to appear in either house of the Diet for the purpose of speaking on bills, and each house has the right to compel the appearance of Cabinet members.[20]

Legislative process

The vast majority of bills are submitted to the Diet by the Cabinet.[21] Bills are usually drafted by the relevant ministry, sometimes with the advice of an external committee if the issue is sufficiently important or neutrality is necessary.[22] Such advisory committees may include university professors, trade union representatives, industry representatives, and local governors and mayors, and invariably include retired officials.[21] Such draft bills would be sent to the Cabinet Legislation Bureau of the government, as well as to the ruling party.[21]

Building

History

Japan's first modern legislature was the Imperial Diet (帝国議会, Teikoku-gikai) established by the Meiji Constitution in force from 1889 to 1947. The Meiji Constitution was adopted on February 11, 1889, and the Imperial Diet first met on November 29, 1890, when the document entered into force.[23] The first Imperial Diet of 1890 was plagued by controversy and political tensions. The Prime Minister of Japan at that time was General Count Yamagata Aritomo, who entered into a confrontation with the legislative body over military funding. During this time, there were many critics of the army who derided the Meiji slogan of "rich country, strong military" as in effect producing a poor country (albeit with a strong military). They advocated for infrastructure projects and lower taxes instead and felt their interests were not being served by high levels of military spending. As a result of these early conflicts, public opinion of politicians was not favorable.[24]

The Imperial Diet consisted of a House of Representatives and a House of Peers (貴族院, Kizoku-in). The House of Representatives was directly elected, if on a limited franchise; universal adult male suffrage was introduced in 1925 when the Universal Manhood Suffrage Law was passed, but excluded women, and was limited to men 25 years or older.[25] The House of Peers, much like the British House of Lords, consisted of high-ranking nobles chosen by the Emperor.[26]

The first election by universal suffrage without distinction of sex was held in 1946, but it was not until 1947, when the constitution for post-war Japan came into effect, that universal suffrage was established In Japan.[27]

The word diet derives from Latin and was a common name for an assembly in medieval European polities like the Holy Roman Empire. The Meiji Constitution was largely based on the form of constitutional monarchy found in nineteenth century Prussia that placed the king not as a servant of the state but rather the sole holder of power and sovereignty over his kingdom, which the Japanese view of their emperor and his role at the time favoured.[28] The new Diet was modeled partly on the German Reichstag and partly on the British Westminster system. Unlike the post-war constitution, the Meiji constitution granted a real political role to the Emperor, although in practice the Emperor's powers were largely directed by a group of oligarchs called the genrō or elder statesmen.[29]

To become law or bill, a constitutional amendment had to have the assent of both the Diet and the Emperor. This meant that while the Emperor could no longer legislate by decree he still had a veto over the Diet. The Emperor also had complete freedom in choosing the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and so, under the Meiji Constitution, Prime Ministers often were not chosen from and did not enjoy the confidence of the Diet.[26] The Imperial Diet was also limited in its control over the budget. However, the Diet could veto the annual budget. If no budget was approved, the budget of the previous year continued in force. This changed with the new constitution after World War II.[30]

The proportional representation system for the House of Councillors, introduced in 1982, was the first major electoral reform under the post-war constitution. Instead of choosing national constituency candidates as individuals, as had previously been the case, voters cast ballots for parties. Individual councillors, listed officially by the parties before the election, are selected on the basis of the parties' proportions of the total national constituency vote.[31] The system was introduced to reduce the excessive money spent by candidates for the national constituencies. Critics charged, however, that this new system benefited the two largest parties, the LDP and the Japan Socialist Party (now Social Democratic Party), which in fact had sponsored the reform.[32] As a result of both the 2024 Japanese general election and the 2025 Japanese House of Councillors election, the LDP for the first time in party history failed to control either of the two houses in the National Diet.[33]

List of sessions

There are three types of sessions of the National Diet:[34]

  • R – jōkai (常会), regular, annual sessions of the National Diet, often called "regular National Diet" (通常国会, tsūjō Kokkai). These are nowadays usually called in January, they last for 150 days and can be extended once.
  • E – rinjikai (臨時会), extraordinary sessions of the National Diet, often called "extraordinary National Diet" (臨時国会, rinji Kokkai). These are often called in autumn, or in the summer after a regular election of the House of Councillors (参議院議員通常選挙, sangiingiin tsūjōsenkyo) or after a full-term general election of the House of Representatives (衆議院議員総選挙, shūgiingiin sōsenkyo). Its length is negotiated between the two houses, it can be extended twice.
  • S – tokubetsukai (特別会), special sessions of the National Diet, often called "special National Diet" (特別国会, tokubetsu Kokkai). They are called only after a dissolution and early general election of the House of Representatives. Because the cabinet must resign after a House of Representatives election, the National Diet always chooses a prime minister-designate in a special session (but inversely, not all PM elections take place in a special Diet). A special session can be extended twice.
  • HCES – There is a fourth type of legislative session: If the House of Representatives is dissolved, a National Diet cannot be convened. In urgent cases, the cabinet may invoke an emergency session (緊急集会, kinkyū shūkai) of the House of Councillors to take provisional decisions for the whole Diet. As soon as the whole National Diet convenes again, these decisions must be confirmed by the House of Representatives or become ineffective. Such emergency sessions have been called twice in history, in 1952 and 1953.[35]

Any session of the National Diet may be cut short by a dissolution of the House of Representatives (衆議院解散, shūgiin kaisan). In the table, this is listed simply as "(dissolution)"; the House of Councillors or the National Diet as such cannot be dissolved.

List of National Diet sessions[36]
DietTypeOpenedClosedLength in days
(originally scheduled+extension[s])
1stS1947-5-201947-12-09204 (50+154)
2ndR1947-12-101948-07-05209 (150+59)
3rdE1948-10-111948-11-3051 (30+21)
4thR1948-12-011948-12-23
(dissolution)
23 (150)
5thS1949-02-111949-05-31110 (70+40)
6thE1949-10-251949-12-0340 (30+10)
7thR1949-12-041950-05-02150
8thE1950-07-211950-07-3120
9thE1950-11-211950-12-0919 (18+1)
10thR1950-12-101951-06-05178 (150+28)
11thE1951-08-161951-08-183
12thE1951-10-101951-11-3052 (40+12)
13thR1951-12-101952-07-31225 (150+85)
14th (ja)R1952-08-261952-08-28
(dissolution)
3 (150)
–[HCES]1952-08-311952-08-31[1]
15th (ja)S1952-10-241953-03-14
(dissolution)
142 (60+99)
–[HCES]1953-03-181953-03-20[3]
16thS1953-05-181953-08-1085 (75+10)
17thE1953-10-291953-11-0710 (7+3)
18thE1953-11-301953-12-089
19thR1953-12-101957-06-15188 (150+38)
20thE1954-11-301954-12-0910 (9+1)
21stR1954-12-101955-01-24
(dissolution)
46 (150)
22ndS1955-03-181955-07-30135 (105+30)
23rdE1955-11-221955-12-1625
24thR1955-12-201956-06-03167 (150+17)
25thE1956-11-121956-12-1332 (25+7)
26thR1956-12-201957-05-19151 (150+1)
27thE1957-11-011957-11-1414 (12+2)
28thR1957-12-201958-04-25
(dissolution)
127 (150)
29thS1958-06-101958-07-0829 (25+4)
30thE1958-09-291958-12-0770 (40+30)
31stR1958-12-101959-05-02144
32ndE1959-06-221959-07-0312
33rdE1959-10-261959-12-2763 (60+13)
34thR1959-12-291960-07-15200 (150+50)
35thE1960-07-181960-07-225
36thE1960-10-171960-10-24
(dissolution)
8 (10)
37thS1960-12-051960-12-2218
38thR1960-12-261961-06-08165 (150+15)
39thE1961-09-251961-10-3137
40thR1961-12-091962-05-07150
41stE1962-08-041962-09-0230
42ndE1962-12-081962-12-2316 (12+4)
43rdR1962-12-241963-07-06195 (150+45)
44thE1963-10-151963-10-23
(dissolution)
9 (30)
45thS1963-12-041963-12-1815
46thR1963-12-201964-06-26190 (150+40)
47thE1964-11-091964-12-1840
48thR1964-12-211965-06-01163 (150+13)
49thE1965-07-221965-08-1121
50thE1965-10-051965-12-1370
51stR1965-12-201966-06-27190 (150+40)
52ndE1966-07-111966-07-3020
53rdE1966-11-301966-12-2021
54th (ja)R1966-12-271966-12-27
(dissolution)
1 (150)
55thS1967-02-151967-07-21157 (136+21)
56thE1967-07-271967-08-1823 (15+8)
57thE1967-12-041967-12-2320
58thR1967-12-271968-06-03160 (150+10)
59thE1968-08-011968-08-1010
60thE1968-12-101968-12-2112
61stR1968-12-271969-08-05222 (150+72)
62ndE1969-11-291969-12-02
(dissolution)
4 (14)
63rdS1970-01-141970-05-13120
64th (ja)E1970-11-241970-12-1825
65thR1970-12-261971-05-24150
66thE1971-07-141971-07-2411
67thE1971-10-161971-12-2773 (70+3)
68thR1971-12-291972-06-16171 (150+21)
69thE1972-07-061972-07-127
70thE1972-10-271972-11-13
(dissolution)
18 (21)
71st (ja)S1972-12-221973-09-27280 (150+130)
72ndR1973-12-011974-06-03185 (150+35)
73rdE1974-07-241974-07-318
74thE1974-12-091974-12-2517
75thR1974-12-271975-07-04190 (150+40)
76thE1975-09-111975-12-25106 (75+31)
77thR1975-12-271976-05-24150
78thE1976-09-161976-11-0450
79thE1976-12-241976-12-285
80thR1976-12-301977-06-09162 (150+12)
81stE1977-07-271977-08-038
82ndE1977-09-291977-11-2558 (40+18)
83rdE1977-12-071977-12-104
84thR1977-12-191978-06-16180 (150+30)
85thE1978-09-181978-10-2134
86thE1978-12-061978-12-127
87thR1978-12-221979-06-14175 (150+25)
88thE1979-08-301979-09-07
(dissolution)
9 (30)
89thS1979-10-301979-11-1618
90thE1979-11-261979-12-1116
91stR1979-12-211980-05-19
(dissolution)
151 (150+9)
92ndS1980-07-171980-07-2610
93rdE1980-09-291980-11-2962 (50+12)
94thR1980-12-221981-06-06167 (150+17)
95thE1981-09-271981-11-2866 (55+11)
96th (ja)R1981-12-211982-08-21244 (150+94)
97thE1982-11-261982-12-2530 (25+5)
98thR1982-12-281983-05-26150
99thE1983-07-181983-07-236
100thE1983-09-081983-11-28
(dissolution)
82 (70+12)
101stS1983-12-261984-08-08227 (150+77)
102ndR1984-12-011985-06-25207 (150+57)
103rdE1985-10-141985-12-2169 (62+7)
104thR1985-12-241986-05-22150
105th (ja)E1986-06-021986-06-02
(dissolution)
1
106thS1986-07-221986-07-254
107thE1986-09-111986-07-254
108thR1986-12-291987-05-27150
109thE1987-07-061987-09-1976 (65+11)
110thE1987-11-061987-11-116
111thE1987-11-271987-12-1216
112thR1987-12-281988-05-25150
113thE1988-07-191988-12-28163 (70+93)
114thR1988-12-301989-06-22175 (150+25)
115thE1989-08-071989-08-126
116thE1989-09-281989-12-1680
117thR1989-12-251990-01-24
(dissolution)
31 (150)
118thS1990-02-271990-06-26120
119thE1990-10-121990-11-1030
120thR1990-12-101991-05-08150
121stE1991-08-051991-10-0461
122ndE1991-11-051991-12-2147 (36+11)
123rdR1992-01-241992-06-21150
124thE1992-08-071992-08-115
125thE1992-10-301992-12-1042 (40+2)
126thR1993-01-221993-06-18
(dissolution)
148 (150)
127thS1993-08-051993-08-2824 (10+14)
128thE1993-09-171994-01-29135 (90+45)
129thR1994-01-311994-06-29150
130thE1994-07-181994-07-225
131stE1994-09-301994-12-0971 (65+6)
132ndR1995-01-201995-06-18150
133rdE1995-08-041995-08-085
134thE1995-09-291995-12-1578 (46+32)
135thE1996-01-111996-01-133
136th (ja)R1996-01-221996-06-19150
137thE1996-09-271996-09-27
(dissolution)
1
138thS1996-11-071996-11-126
139thE1996-11-291996-12-1820
140thR1997-01-201997-06-18150
141stE1997-09-291997-12-1275
142ndR1998-01-121998-06-18158 (150+8)
143rd (ja)E1998-07-301998-10-1679 (70+9)
144thE1998-11-271998-12-1418
145thR1999-01-191999-08-13207 (150+57)
146thE1999-10-291999-12-1548
147thR2000-01-202000-06-02
(dissolution)
135 (150)
148th (ja)S2000-07-042000-07-063
149thE2000-07-282000-08-0913
150thE2000-09-212000-12-0172
151stR2001-01-312001-06-29150
152ndE2001-08-072001-08-104
153rdE2001-09-272001-12-0772
154thR2002-01-212002-07-31192 (150+42)
155thE2002-10-182002-12-1357
156thR2003-01-202003-07-28190 (150+40)
157thE2003-09-292003-10-10
(dissolution)
15 (36)
158thS2003-11-192003-11-279
159thR2004-01-192004-06-16150
160thE2004-07-302004-08-068
161stE2004-10-122004-12-0353
162ndR2005-01-212005-08-08
(dissolution)
200 (150+55)
163rd (ja)S2005-09-212005-11-0142
164th (ja)R2006-01-202006-06-18150
165th (ja)S2006-09-262006-12-1985 (81+4)
166th (ja)R2007-01-252007-07-05162 (150+12)
167th (ja)E2007-08-072007-08-104
168th (ja)E2007-09-102008-01-15128 (62+66)
169th (ja)R2008-01-182008-06-21156 (150+6)
170th (ja)E2008-09-242008-12-2593 (68+25)
171st (ja)R2009-01-052009-07-21
(dissolution)
198 (150+55)
172nd (ja)S2009-09-162009-09-194
173rd (ja)E2009-10-262009-12-0440 (36+4)
174th (ja)R2010-01-182010-06-16150
175th (ja)E2010-07-302010-08-068
176th (ja)E2010-10-012010-12-0364
177th (ja)R2011-01-242011-08-31220 (150+70)
178th (ja)E2011-09-132011-09-3018 (4+14)
179th (ja)E2011-10-202011-12-0951
180th (ja)R2012-01-242012-09-08229 (150+79)
181st (ja)E2012-10-292012-11-16
(dissolution)
19 (33)
182nd (ja)S2012-12-262012-12-283
183rd (ja)R2013-01-282013-06-26150
184th (ja)E2013-08-022013-08-076
185th (ja)E2013-10-152013-12-0855 (53+2)
186th (ja)R2014-01-242014-06-22150
187th (ja)E2014-09-292014-11-21
(dissolution)
54 (63)
188th (ja)S2014-12-242014-12-263
189th (ja)R2015-01-262015-09-27245 (150+95)
190th (ja)R2016-01-042016-06-01150
191st (ja)E2016-08-012016-08-033
192nd (ja)E2016-09-262016-12-1783 (66+17)
193rd (ja)R2017-01-202017-06-18150
194th (ja)E2017-09-282017-09-28
(dissolution)
1
195th (ja)S2017-11-012017-12-0939
196th (ja)R2018-01-222018-07-22182 (150+32)
197th (ja)E2018-10-242018-12-1048
198th (ja)R2019-01-282019-06-26150
199th (ja)E2019-08-012019-08-055
200th (ja)E2019-10-042019-12-0967
201st (ja)R2020-01-202020-06-17150
202nd (ja)E2020-09-162020-09-183
203rd (ja)E2020-10-262020-12-0541
204th (ja)R2021-01-182021-06-16150
205th (ja)E2021-10-042021-10-14
(dissolution)
11
206th (ja)S2021-11-102021-11-123
207th (ja)E2021-12-062021-12-2116
208th (ja)R2022-01-172022-06-15150
209th (ja)E2022-08-032022-08-053
210th (ja)E2022-10-032022-12-1069
211th (ja)R2023-01-232023-06-21150
212th (ja)E2023-10-202023-12-1355
213th (ja)R2024-01-262024-06-23150
214th (ja)E2024-10-012024-10-09
(dissolution)
9
215th (ja)S2024-11-112024-11-144
216th (ja)E2024-11-282024-12-2427
217th (ja)R2025-01-242025-06-22150
218th (ja)E2025-08-012025-08-055
219th (ja)E2025-10-212025-12-1758
220th (ja)R2026-01-232026-01-23
(dissolution)
1
221st (ja)S2026-02-18Ongoing

List of House of Representatives general elections

19th century

ElectionDatePrime Minister appointed by Emperor
(during term)
TurnoutSeatsDate of
dissolution (D) /
expiration of term (E)
Registered
voters
Largest party / Seats ShareEmperor
Imperial Diet (1890–1947); upper house: House of PeersMeiji
(era)
1st1 July 1890Yamagata Aritomo93.91%300450,872bgcolor= rowspan="10" style="white-space:nowrap" |Constitutional Liberalrowspan=2 bgcolor=|130rowspan=2 bgcolor=|43.33%
(Matsukata Masayoshi)
2nd15 February 1892Matsukata Masayoshi91.59%(D) December 25, 1891434,594rowspan=2 bgcolor=|94rowspan=2 bgcolor=|31.33%
(Itō Hirobumi)
3rdMarch 1, 1894Itō Hirobumi88.76%(D) December 30, 1893440,113bgcolor=|120bgcolor=|40.00%
4th1 September 1894Itō Hirobumi84.84%(D) June 2, 1894460,483rowspan=3 bgcolor=|107rowspan=3 bgcolor=|35.66%
(Matsukata Masayoshi)
(Itō Hirobumi)
5th15 March 1898Itō Hirobumi87.50%(D) December 25, 1897452,637rowspan=2 bgcolor=|105rowspan=2 bgcolor=|35.00%
bgcolor=|(Ōkuma Shigenobu)
6th10 August 1898bgcolor=|Ōkuma Shigenobu79.91%(D) June 10, 1898502,292rowspan=4 bgcolor=|Kensei Hontōrowspan=4 bgcolor=|124rowspan=4 bgcolor=|41.33%
(Yamagata Aritomo)
(Itō Hirobumi)
(Katsura Tarō)

20th century

ElectionDatePrime Minister appointed by Emperor
(during term)
TurnoutSeatsDate of
dissolution (D) /
expiration of term (E)
Registered
voters
Largest party / Seats ShareEmperor
7thAugust 10, 1902Katsura Tarō88.39%376(E) August 9, 1902982,868Rikken Seiyūkai19150.79%Meiji
(era)
8thMarch 1, 190386.17%(D) December 28, 1902958,32217546.54%
9th1 March 1904Katsura Tarō86.06%379(D) December 11, 1903762,44513335.09%
(Saionji Kinmochi)
10th15 May 1908Saionji Kinmochi85.29%(E) March 27, 19081,590,04518749.34%
(Katsura Tarō)
(Saionji Kinmochi)
11th15 May 1912Saionji Kinmochi89.58%381(E) May 14, 19121,506,14320954.85%
(Katsura Tarō)Taishō
(era)
(Yamamoto Gonnohyōe)
bgcolor=|(Ōkuma Shigenobu)
12th25 March 1915bgcolor=|Ōkuma Shigenobu92.13%(D) December 25, 19141,546,411rowspan=2 bgcolor=|Rikken Dōshikairowspan=2 bgcolor=|153rowspan=2 bgcolor=|40.15%
(Terauchi Masatake)
13th20 April 1917Terauchi Masatake91.92%(D) January 25, 19171,422,126rowspan=7 bgcolor=|Rikken Seiyūkairowspan=2 bgcolor=|165rowspan=2 bgcolor=|43.30%
bgcolor=|(Hara Takashi)
14th10 May 1920bgcolor=|Hara Takashi86.73%464(D) February 26, 19203,069,148rowspan=5 bgcolor=|278rowspan=5 bgcolor=|59.91%
bgcolor=|(Takahashi Korekiyo)
(Katō Tomosaburō)
(Yamamoto Gonnohyōe)
(Kiyoura Keigo)
15th10 May 1924bgcolor=|Katō Takaaki91.18%(D) January 31, 19243,288,405rowspan=3 bgcolor=|Kenseikairowspan=3 bgcolor=|151rowspan=3 bgcolor=|32.54%
bgcolor=|(Wakatsuki Reijirō)
bgcolor=|(Tanaka Giichi)Shōwa
(era)
16th20 February 1928bgcolor=|Tanaka Giichi80.36%466(D) January 21, 192812,408,678rowspan=2 bgcolor=|Rikken Seiyūkairowspan=2 bgcolor=|218rowspan=2 bgcolor=|46.78%
(Hamaguchi Osachi)
17th20 February 1930Hamaguchi Osachi83.34%(D) January 21, 193012,812,895Rikken Minseitō27358.58%
(Wakatsuki Reijirō)
(Inukai Tsuyoshi)
18th20 February 1932Inukai Tsuyoshi81.68%(D) January 21, 193213,237,841Rikken Seiyukai30164.59%
(Saitō Makoto)
(Keisuke Okada)
19th20 February 1936Kōki Hirota78.65%(D) January 21, 193614,479,553Rikken Minseitō20543.99%
(Senjūrō Hayashi)
20th30 April 1937Senjūrō Hayashi73.31%(D) March 31, 193714,618,29817938.41%
(Fumimaro Konoe)
(Hiranuma Kiichirō)
(Nobuyuki Abe)
(Mitsumasa Yonai)
(Fumimaro Konoe)
(Fumimaro Konoe)
(Hideki Tojo)
21st30 April 1942Hideki Tojo83.16%(E) April 29, 194214,594,287Imperial Rule Assistance Association38181.75%
(Kuniaki Koiso)
(Kantarō Suzuki)
(Kantarō Suzuki)
(Prince Naruhiko Higashikuni)
(Kijūrō Shidehara)
22ndApril 10, 1946Shigeru Yoshida72.08%(D) December 18, 194536,878,420Liberal14130.25%
23rd25 April 1947Tetsu Katayama67.95%(D) March 31, 194740,907,493Socialist14330.68%
(Hitoshi Ashida)
(Shigeru Yoshida)
National Diet (1947–present); upper house: House of Councillors
24th23 January 1949Shigeru Yoshida74.04%466(D) December 23, 194842,105,300Democratic Liberal26456.65%
(Shigeru Yoshida)
25thOctober 1, 1952Shigeru Yoshida76.43%(D) August 28, 195246,772,584Liberal24051.50%
26th19 April 1953Shigeru Yoshida74.22%(D) March 14, 195347,090,167Liberal
Yoshida faction
19942.70%
(Ichirō Hatoyama)
27th27 February 1955Ichirō Hatoyama75.84%467(D) January 24, 195549,235,375Democratic18539.61%
(Ichirō Hatoyama)
(Tanzan Ishibashi)
(Nobusuke Kishi)
28th22 May 1958Nobusuke Kishi76.99%(D) April 25, 195852,013,529Liberal Democratic28761.45%
(Hayato Ikeda)
29thNovember 20, 1960Hayato Ikeda73.51%(D) October 24, 196054,312,99329663.38%
30th21 November 1963Hayato Ikeda71.14%(D) October 23, 196358,281,67828360.59%
(Eisaku Satō)
31stJanuary 29, 1967Eisaku Satō73.99%486(D) December 27, 196662,992,79627756.99%
32nd27 December 1969Eisaku Satō68.51%(D) December 2, 196969,260,42428859.25%
(Kakuei Tanaka)
33rd10 December 1972Kakuei Tanaka71.76%491(D) November 13, 197273,769,63627155.19%
(Takeo Miki)
34th5 December 1976Takeo Fukuda73.45%511(E) December 9, 197677,926,58824948.72%
(Masayoshi Ōhira)
35thOctober 7, 1979Masayoshi Ōhira68.01%(D) September 7, 197980,169,92424848.53%
36th22 June 1980Zenkō Suzuki74.57%(D) May 19, 198080,925,03428455.57%
(Yasuhiro Nakasone)
37thDecember 18, 1983Yasuhiro Nakasone67.94%(D) November 28, 198384,252,60825048.92%
38th2 June 1986Yasuhiro Nakasone71.40%512(D) June 2, 198686,426,84530058.59%
(Noboru Takeshita)
(Sōsuke Uno)Akihito
(Heisei)

(era)
(Toshiki Kaifu)
39th18 February 1990Toshiki Kaifu73.31%(D) January 24, 199090,322,90827553.71%
(Kiichi Miyazawa)
40th18 July 1993Morihiro Hosokawa67.26%511(D) June 18, 199394,477,81622343.63%
(Tsutomu Hata)
(Tomiichi Murayama)
(Ryūtarō Hashimoto)
41st20 October 1996Ryūtarō Hashimoto59.65%500(D) September 27, 199697,680,71923947.80%
(Keizō Obuchi)
(Yoshirō Mori)
42nd25 June 2000Yoshirō Mori62.49%480(D) June 2, 2000100,492,32823348.54%
(Junichiro Koizumi)

21st century

ElectionDatePrime Minister appointed by Emperor
(during term)
TurnoutSeatsDate of
dissolution (D) /
expiration of term (E)
Registered
voters
Largest party / Seats ShareEmperor
43rd9 November 2003Junichiro Koizumi59.86%480(D) 10 October 2003102,306,684Liberal Democratic23749.37%Akihito
(Heisei)

(era)
44th11 September 2005Junichiro Koizumi67.51%(D) 8 August 2005103,067,96629661.66%
(Shinzo Abe)
(Yasuo Fukuda)
(Tarō Asō)
45th30 August 2009Yukio Hatoyama69.28%(D) 21 July 2009104,057,361Democratic30864.16%
(Naoto Kan)
(Yoshihiko Noda)
46th16 December 2012Shinzo Abe59.32%(D) 16 November 2012103,959,866Liberal Democratic29461.25%
47th14 December 201452.66%475(D) 21 November 2014104,067,10429161.26%
48th22 October 2017Shinzo Abe53.68%465(D) 28 September 2017106,091,22928461.08%
(Yoshihide Suga)Naruhito
(Reiwa)

(era)
(Fumio Kishida)
49th31 October 2021Fumio Kishida55.93%(D) 14 October 2021105,622,75826156.12%
(Shigeru Ishiba)
50th27 October 2024Shigeru Ishiba53.85%(D) 9 October 2024103,880,74919141.08%
(Sanae Takaichi)
51st8 February 2026Sanae Takaichi56.26%(D) 23 January 2026103,211,22431667.96%

List of House of Councillors regular elections

20th century

ElectionCabinetPrime MinisterDateTurnoutTotal
seats
Elected
seats
Term
expiration
date
Largest party / Seats shareEmperor
1stYoshida IShigeru Yoshida20 April 194761.12%2502502 May 1953Socialist4718.80%Shōwa
(era)
2ndYoshida III4 June 195072.19%1253 June 1956Liberal7630.40%
3rdYoshida IV24 April 195363.18%2 May 19599337.20%
4thI. Hatoyama IIIIchirō Hatoyama8 July 195662.11%7 July 1962Liberal Democratic12248.80%
5thKishi IINobusuke Kishi2 June 195958.75%1 June 196513252.80%
6thIkeda IIHayato Ikeda1 July 196268.22%7 July 196814256.80%
7thSatō IEisaku Satō4 July 196567.02%1 July 197114055.77%
8thSatō II7 July 196868.94%7 July 197414254.80%
9thSatō III27 June 197159.24%25212610 July 197713152.61%
10thK. Tanaka IIKakuei Tanaka7 July 197473.20%7 July 198012650.40%
11thT. FukudaTakeo Fukuda10 July 197768.49%9 July 198312449.79%
12thŌhira IIMasayoshi Ōhira22 June 198074.54%7 July 198613554.00%
13thNakasone IYasuhiro Nakasone26 June 198357.00%9 July 198913754.36%
14thNakasone II (R2)6 July 198671.36%7 July 199214356.74%
15thUnoSōsuke Uno23 July 198965.02%25212622 July 199510943.25%Akihito
(Heisei)

(era)
16thMiyazawaKiichi Miyazawa26 July 199250.72%25 July 199810742.46%
17thMurayamaTomiichi Murayama23 July 199544.52%22 July 200111144.04%
18thHashimoto II (R)Ryutaro Hashimoto12 July 199858.84%25 July 200410340.87%

21st century

ElectionCabinetPrime MinisterDateTurnoutTotal
seats
Elected
seats
Term
expiration
date
Majority party / Seats shareEmperor
19thKoizumi IJunichiro Koizumi29 July 200156.44%24712128 July 2007Liberal Democratic11144.93%Akihito
(Heisei)

(era)
20thKoizumi II11 July 200456.57%24225 July 201011547.52%
21stS. Abe IShinzo Abe29 July 200758.64%28 July 2013Democratic10945.04%
22ndKanNaoto Kan11 July 201057.92%25 July 201610643.80%
23rdS. Abe IIShinzo Abe21 July 201352.61%28 July 2019Liberal Democratic11547.52%
24thS. Abe III (R1)10 July 201654.70%25 July 202212150.00%
25thS. Abe IV (R1)21 July 201948.80%24512428 July 202511346.12%Naruhito
(Reiwa)

(era)
26thKishida IIFumio Kishida10 July 202252.05%24825 July 202811947.98%
27thIshiba IIShigeru Ishiba20 July 202558.51%24812528 July 203110140.73%

See also

Notes

  1. ^ * CDP (39) * Independent (1)
  2. ^ * Independent (2)
  3. ^ * Team Mirai (1) * Independent (1)
  4. ^ * LDP (315) * Independent (1)
  5. ^ * LDP (1/Speaker) * CRA (1/Vice Speaker) * Reiwa (1) * Genzei–Yukoku (1) * Independent (3)

References

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